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Abstract
Using proprietary data on bank-issued knock-out warrants, we ﬁnd that in-
dividual investors, on aggregate, bet on price reversals. In a simple model we
demonstrate that a mechanical channel due to market and product characteris-
tics may account for investors' betting on reversals, even if investors' purchasing
and selling decisions are independent of past returns. Our empirical results sug-
gest that the mechanical channel can explain almost one half of the association
between past returns and individual investors' order ﬂow, while the rest can be
attributed to the disposition eﬀect, that is, investors' higher propensity to sell
assets from their portfolios that have appreciated.
1 Introduction
The popularity of bank issued retail structured products increased signiﬁcantly in
the recent decade. In Germany, where these products are most popular, the total
outstanding value of the exchange traded products (in Stuttgart and Frankfurt) was
over e 68bn in March 2016.12 The purpose of structured products is to liberate the
retail investor by providing access to a wide range of derivative products, which was
only available for institutional investors previously. As it is often argued by banks,
individual investors have limited access to derivatives markets because they cannot
aﬀord the costs of maintaining a margin account. Therefore, banks designed structured
products such that investors cannot lose more than the money they invest, which makes
it very convenient for them.
Using proprietary data on bank-issued knock-out warrants written on the German
DAX index allows us to track investors' aggregate position. We ﬁnd that individual
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1Deutsche Derivative Verband (2016)
2In order to put this number in perspective, consider the fact that the total market capitalization
of the 30 largest German companies is in the range of e 1000bn at that time. Also, Célérier and Vallée
(2017) show that the total amount of sold structured products (including non-exchange traded) since
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investors bet on price reversals. The ﬁnding is consistent with the disposition eﬀect,
that is, investors' higher propensity to sell winners from their portfolios compared
to selling losers. In particular, after positive returns of the DAX, investors are more
likely to sell their call contracts, while after negative returns, they are more likely
to sell their puts. In addition, we demonstrate in a simple model that a mechanical
channel due to market and product characteristics may also account for investors'
betting on reversals, even if investors' selling decision is independent of past returns.
We start with the observation that a positive (negative) return on the underlying
decreases (increases) the leverage of the available call warrant relative to the leverage
of the available put warrant. In turn, if the leverage of available call is higher than the
leverage of the put and investors allocate their funds randomly between taking long
and short positions, then investors, on aggregate, end up having a long position. Our
empirical results suggest that this mechanical eﬀect can explain almost one half of the
association between past returns and individual investors' order ﬂow.
The market for knock-out warrants provides an attractive laboratory to analyze
individual investor behavior for two reasons. First, only individual investors purchase
these. Institutional investors have better alternatives, like standard options exchanges
where counterparty risk is managed.3 Second, banks oﬀer both call and put options
for the underlying assets which makes it equally convenient for investors to take long
and short positions. In particular, investors do not incur the typical costs of posting
collateral to their broker when short selling an asset. Banks quote prices for their
oﬀered warrants through standard exchanges, allowing individuals to easily access
these and also resell them to the issuing bank, should they wish to do so.
Knock-out warrants (also known as leverage/turbo certiﬁcates) are barrier options,
that expire before their maturity date if the underlying's price reaches a prespeciﬁed
barrier. Technically (based on their payoﬀ functions), they are down-and-out barrier
call options and up-and-out barrier put options. That is, the call (put) warrant gets
knocked out and expires when the underlying reaches a lower (upper) bound or when
they reach maturity without hitting their respective barrier. They are referred to as
warrants because the issuing bank does not have to post a margin as collateral when
selling these to investors (hence they carry the credit risk of the issuing bank). Since
barrier options have some characteristics that resemble futures contracts, banks often
advertise knock-out warrants as futures contracts and investors use these to carry out
speculative bets. However, a distinctive feature of knock-out warrants is that their
leverage sharply varies with the underlying's value. When the underlying appreciates
the leverage of a call (put) warrant decreases (increases).
We have obtained transaction level data on warrants written on the German DAX
index, a blue chip stock market index consisting of 30 major German ﬁrms. Our
warrants are issued by a mid-sized European bank and were issued on a regional
exchange.4 For each transaction we can see a time stamp, the number of contracts
exchanged, the price and, most importantly, the sign of the trade. Therefore, the
classiﬁcation into buy and sell volume in our data is exact. That is, we know whether
investors are purchasing the warrants from the bank or reselling them to the bank
for each trade. This allows us to track investors' aggregate position. The obvious
limitation of the data is that we cannot link transactions to individuals.5
3Average value of a trade is below e 2000 in our sample, which also suggests that institutional
investors are not present.
4We have agreed not to name the bank who provided us the data.
5Since the warrants are traded through an exchange the issuing bank also has no information
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As a main result, we show that investors bet on price reversals. That is, investors
tend to be net buyers of call contracts after contractions in the DAX and, symmetri-
cally, net buyers of put contracts after increases in the DAX.
However, as we demonstrate in a simple model, due to product and market char-
acteristics a mechanical channel could account for investors' aggregate behavior. In
the model, investors individually randomize between speculating for increases and
decreases in the DAX by buying the available call or put warrant, respectively. Im-
portantly, investors who arrive to the exchange have a ﬁxed sum to speculate with.
Therefore, if the available call warrant happens to have higher leverage compared
to the available put warrant, then  in expectation  arriving investors open a long
position. We label the diﬀerence between the call's and put's leverage the leverage
diﬀerential. Our insight is that the leverage diﬀerential perfectly correlates with past
returns, introducing a mechanical correlation between past returns and investors' order
ﬂow.
Empirical results suggest that the mechanical channel is relevant. We bring our
model to the data in a reduced form analysis by introducing the leverage diﬀerential
as a control variable. Our estimates suggest that our proposed mechanical channel
accounts for almost one half of the association between past returns and investors'
order ﬂow.
Investors speculate on price reversals mainly through their selling decisions, which
is consistent with the disposition eﬀect. That is, after a warrant appreciates, investors
are more likely to become net sellers of the warrant. Since this pattern is detected for
both call and put warrants, investors, on aggregate, bet on price reversals both after
appreciations and depreciations of the DAX index. Additionally, we provide evidence
indicating that relatively larger investors' purchasing decisions are not aﬀected by past
returns (except for the mechanical channel), while relatively smaller investors place
bets on price reversals through their purchasing decisions, too.
Figures 1-3 give a graphical summary of our main ﬁndings. The diﬀerence between
the number of call and put contracts investors hold is an accurate proxy for their
aggregate exposure to the DAX index. It tells us how many (constant multiple of) euros
investors' total portfolio appreciates if the DAX index increases by one unit. Figure 1
conﬁrms that investors build up long positions during contractions in the underlying
and short positions during increases in the underlying. That is, they speculate on
reversals.
Figure 2 shows the available menu of call and put contracts represented by their
barriers in our sample. Barriers below the DAX index represent call contracts and
those above represent put contracts. Since the leverage of a given contract is inversely
related to the distance between the barrier and the underlying, the leverage diﬀerential
of available call and put contracts varies signiﬁcantly. Finally, the leverage diﬀerential
of the highest levered call and highest levered put is shown on Figure 3, together with
investors' aggregate exposure. The correlation is remarkably strong, suggesting that
the mechanical channel described above plays a crucial role in investors' positions.
1.1 Related literature
To the best of our knowledge this is the ﬁrst paper to analyze individual investors'
order ﬂow in the market of knock-out warrants. Banks oﬀer knock-out warrants that
enable individual investors to carry out directional bets, both long and short, in a
about the investor's identity in a given transaction.
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convenient way. We show in a model that if investors allocate their funds randomly
between long and short positions, the asymmetric leverage of oﬀered products leads
investors to speculate on price reversals through a mechanical channel. Our empirical
results suggest that investors, in fact, bet on price reversals, even after accounting for
this mechanical channel.
Our ﬁndings are in line with previous research suggesting that individuals are con-
trarians. Contrarian behavior is a label for investors betting on reversals: a negative
correlation of past returns and investors' net purchases. One interpretation of contrar-
ian behavior is that individuals provide liquidity to institutions who value immediacy.
Kaniel et al. (2008) provide evidence from NYSE stocks which suggest that individu-
als provide liquidity and their behavior is rewarded with excess returns. Focusing on
earnings announcements, Kaniel et al. (2012) show that individual investors' abnormal
returns after earnings announcements can be decomposed into an information and a
liquidity provision component. Their results indicate that both components contribute
about equally to individuals' excess returns. Our diﬀerent setting and our focus on
the DAX index makes it unlikely that informed trading could take place.
The disposition eﬀect is a well documented stylized fact of the literature analyzing
individual investor behavior. According to the disposition eﬀect, investors have a
larger propensity to sell assets from their portfolios that were recent winners compared
to stocks that were recent losers. It has been documented for US (Odean, 1998),
Finnish (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001), Australian (Brown, Chappel, Rosa, and
Walter, 2006) and Chinese (Feng and Seasholes, 2005) investors, among others. We
conﬁrm the presence of the disposition eﬀect on the market for knock-out warrants, a
market in which individual investors drive the order ﬂow. As a marginal contribution,
we show that the disposition eﬀect is stronger for puts compared to calls, that is,
when investors speculate on contractions. For a recent review on individual investor
behavior, see Barber and Odean (2013).
Our highly stylized model is motivated by seminal theoretical papers as well as the
empirical observation that individuals use ﬁnancial markets for sensations seeking, i.e.
to gamble (Dorn and Sengmueller, 2009; Dorn, Dorn, and Sengmueller, 2014; Kumar,
2009). The theoretical literature has used various assumptions to describe the behavior
of individual investors. In seminal papers, noise traders introduced into rational ex-
pectation equilibrium models are often associated with individual investors who trade
randomly due to exogenous reasons, like liquidity shocks (Kyle, 1985; Glosten and
Milgrom, 1985). While these papers' main concern is market liquidity, we focus on
individual investors' aggregate position in the knock-out warrant market when they
randomly allocate their funds  similarly to noise traders.
This is consistent with investors betting on reversals: after recent appreciations of
the underlying the value of calls increases, while the value of puts decreases. Hence,
if investors have a larger propensity to close positions that secure gains, they will sell
the calls, which is equivalent to betting on a price reversal. For example, the theory of
realization utility proposed in Barberis and Xiong (2012) assumes that investors gain
an extra utility from selling assets that have appreciated during the holding period.
This naturally leads to the disposition eﬀect and is also consistent with our ﬁndings.
Theoretical papers analyzing the strategic behavior of banks who issue innovative
ﬁnancial assets for individual investors is scarce. Kondor and K®szegi (2015) build a
model in which investors do not take into account that a bank has private information
when it wants to sell an innovative asset to them. Compared to their model we only
focus on knock-out warrants and analyze how the menu of warrants aﬀects investor
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exposures. By focusing of short run eﬀects we abstract from banks' strategic behavior,
which would be a natural (though not trivial) next step.
The closest to our paper in terms of the type of data used is Baule (2011) who
merges quote data with transactions data in order to recover the order ﬂow of investors.
However, Baule (2011) focuses on discount certiﬁcates and investigates how banks use
anticipated order ﬂow in setting their quotes. The German tax code is exploited
for identiﬁcation, which favors investments held over a year and ﬁnd that investor
demand is high for products that mature just over a year. In contrast, we focus on
highly leveraged products, which are typically held for much shorter periods (often
within day) and presumably for the reason to speculate on directional movements.
Importantly, investors can only open long positions using discount certiﬁcates, while
in our setting investors may just as easily open short positions. Thus, our design
enables pessimists to easily participate which is better suited to analyze investors'
aggregate speculative position.
In a broader sense, our interest in investor behavior and product design relates to
the literature on how individual investors aﬀect asset prices. Ben-David and Hirsh-
leifer (2012) documents that investors are more likely to sell assets that gained or lost a
signiﬁcant amount since purchase, compared to ones that hardly changed in value. An
(2016) builds on this pattern and shows that stocks with both large unrealized gains
and losses produce abnormal returns. It is argued that this is a result of individual
investors exerting selling pressure on these stocks, due to their large movements. We
also ﬁnd some indirect evidence in line with these ﬁndings. In particular, trading ac-
tivity concentrates to the most levered warrants, which have the most volatile returns.
While we do not address possible asset pricing implications of our ﬁndings, if banks
hedge their open positions originating from the warrants market on the underlying's
market, investor behavior could be transmitted.
There is a growing literature that analyzes the pricing of structured products. The
dominating idea in this literature is the "life-cycle hypothesis". According to the life-
cycle hypothesis issuers quote prices that contain higher margins at the beginning
of the product's life (when investors are more likely to purchase the products) and
decrease the margin during the product's life. Since many investors resell the products
to banks before maturity, the banks proﬁt from decreasing the margins over time.
The reason banks are able to do this is that short selling of structured products
is not allowed. The idea of a life cycle eﬀect was put forward by Wilkens et al.
(2003). Wilkens and Stoimenov (2007) study the pricing of leverage products similar
to the ones in the current paper. They ﬁnd that quoted prices signiﬁcantly exceed
upper hedging boundaries and also theoretical values. Henderson and Pearson (2011)
provides evidence suggesting signiﬁcant overpricing for retail structured products in
the U.S. Compared to these papers we assume that warrants are priced fairly, and since
we focus on the asymmetries of oﬀered products in a static framework, the dynamics
of margins should not play a signiﬁcant role here.
Banks have been very active in designing innovative products in order to attract
individual investors' attention. This started a literature that investigates the com-
plexity and performance of these products. Célérier and Vallée (2017) show that as
yields decreased during recent years banks oﬀered more complex products in order to
attract investors with lucrative headline returns. Compared to them we focus on a
standardized segment of retail structured products and focus on how individuals use
these to place speculative bets.6
6While knock-out warrants are standardized, they are also diﬃcult to be correctly appraised by
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes knock-out
warrant and their trading environments. Section 3 introduces the model for individual
investors' aggregate position and derives our testable hypotheses. Section 4 presents
our empirical evidence, followed by discussions and concluding remarks.
2 Market and product characteristics
The German Derivatives Association provides an overview of exchange traded struc-
tured products.7 The two largest exchanges where these products are traded are Euwax
(European Warrant Exchange) in Stuttgart and Frankfurt Smart Trading, which is a
specialized segment of Deutsche Börse in Frankfurt. Trading is concentrated to these
exchanges, but most exchanges in Europe oﬀer the opportunity for banks to issue
structured products (and our data also comes from a smaller exchange).
There are over twenty banks actively issuing structured products. The issuing bank
has to determine product characteristics and is required to continuously quote bid and
ask prices, guaranteeing a liquid secondary market for its assets. Importantly, short
selling is prohibited in these markets. This implies that banks may quote both ask
and bid prices above the fair value of the derivatives.
When the product is introduced, the outstanding number of contracts is zero. The
number of outstanding contracts increases if investors purchase products from the
bank and decreases if investors resell the assets to the issuing bank. As investors may
submit limit orders, it is possible for investors' orders to cross, which does not aﬀect
the outstanding number of contracts. However, in practice the bank is involved in
most transactions.
A major diﬀerence between purchasing a structured product from a bank via a
stock exchange and buying options in an options market is that the stock exchange
does not require the bank to hold a margin account. In other words, by purchasing a
structured product from a bank, investors hold the credit risk of the issuing bank. As
Baule et al. (2008) show, the issuer's credit risk is in fact reﬂected in its quotes, i.e.
issuers with lower credit risk are able to quote higher prices.
Products are broadly classiﬁed into two categories: investment products and lever-
age products. Investment products give over 95% of the volume. The most popular
among them are those oﬀering full or partial capital protection. Within leverage prod-
ucts, KO warrants are the most traded class, accounting for about half of the volume
of leverage products.
2.1 Product characteristics of knock-out warrants
It is useful to ﬁx ideas about the particular derivatives that are analyzed, as it is often
diﬃcult to navigate within the variety of retail structured products.
We have two types of options, knock-out calls (KO call) and knock-out puts (KO
put). The KO call is a call option with a barrier and is known as a down-and-out call,
as the barrier is set below ('down') the price of the underlying and the right to exercise
disappears once the price hits the barrier ('out'). However, there is a twist. The option
has a residual value if the barrier is hit, and the upper bound of the residual value is
individual investors. However, we do not address pricing in this paper.
7See Deutsche Derivative Verband (2014).
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the diﬀerence between the barrier and the strike. Formally, the payoﬀ function of a
KO call is
Payoﬀ of KO call =
{
S(T )−K if S(t) > B ∀ t, t0 < t < T
0 ≤ Residual(≤ B −K) if ∃t: S(t) ≤ B, t0 < t < T
where S(t) is the price of the underlying at time t, t0 is the date when the product
was issued, B is the barrier price and K is the strike price and they satisfy B > K for
the KO call options.
The upper bound of the residual is B − K. Once the price hits the barrier the
bank has to close its hedging positions (i.e. sell the underlying), and if the price jumps
below the barrier then the bank cannot close the position at the barrier. Hence, the
residual value will depend on the price at which the bank manages to close its position.
This essentially shifts the trade execution risk to the holders of the option.8 This is
similar to a stop-loss order, where execution is not guaranteed.9
KO put contracts are put options and can be approximated by up-and-out puts.
The barrier is set above the price of the underlying ('up') and the right to exercise is
lost once the barrier is crossed ('out'). Similarly to the KO call, there is a residual
value if the barrier is hit. Formally, the payoﬀ of a KO put is
Payoﬀ of KO put =
{
K − S(T ) if S(t) < B ∀ t, t0 < t < T
0 ≤ Residual(≤ K −B) if ∃t: S(t) ≥ B, t0 < t < T
where the barrier is always below the strike, B < K.10
In Appendix C we compare the Delta and the Vega of a KO call with those of a
vanilla call and a futures contract, in order to illustrate how KO warrants are priced
relative to these derivatives.11 Here we only focus on leverage, which makes KO
warrants unique.
Since the Delta of the KO call is always close to 1, a ﬁrst-order approximation
for the value of a KO call is its intrinsic value, S(t) − Kcall and for a KO put it is
Kput − S(t). Exactly for this reason, banks often advertise such warrants as futures
contracts, with an automatic stop-loss (instead of getting a margin call). Note that
our model generates exactly these prices, as Ct = St −Kcall and Pt = Kput − St, due
to the fact that we abstracted from knock-out events occurring before maturity.
Using these approximations to express the leverage of a KO call, one ﬁnds that
Leverage of KO call ≈ S(t)
S(t)−Kcall (1)
8This argument assumes that the banks always hedge their exposure. However, if banks do not
completely hedge their exposure then they do not have to close their hedging positions if a KO event
occurs. Hence, banks might be able to proﬁt from not giving the maximum residual value to investors.
9Note that if the option reaches the expiry date without a knock-out event then the payoﬀ of
S(T )−K is received at the expiry date, T , but if the barrier B is hit then the residual value will be
transferred to the investors' account a few business days after the knock-out event.
10In practice, there is also a multiplier that scales the KO products. Since this multiplier does not
aﬀect the analysis, we chose not to complicate the exposition with it.
11Delta measures the unit change in the derivative's price if the underlying's price increases by 1
unit. Vega measures the percent change in the proce of the derivative when the underlying's volatility
increases by 1% point.
7
It is clear from (1) that leverage explodes as the underlying's price approaches the
strike price.
Figure 4 highlights how the leverage of the KO call is related to the leverage of
the vanilla call and that of a futures.12 As expected, the futures always has a leverage
equal to the inverse of the required margin. The leverage of the vanilla call is close to
ﬂat, which highlights the fact that most of its value is the time value. To the contrary,
the value of a KO call will be very close to the intrinsic value, which will imply that
when its intrinsic value is low, its leverage will be high.
The mechanical relation of KO call and put prices, and also their leverage is il-
lustrated in Figure 5. Suppose a bank wants to issue a new KO call. Then it has to
determine the call's terms, e.g. its strike price, barrier and maturity. Figure 5 illus-
trates that the chosen strike price for the call has an important eﬀect on the initial
value and leverage of the new product. Importantly, the new call's strike may result
in a call contract that is either much cheaper and has higher leverage compared to the
already available put product, or much more expensive with a lower leverage.
To sum up, the KO call does seem to be closer to a futures contract than to a vanilla
call (stable Delta close to 1), but notable diﬀerences still remain. The crucial property
that sharply diﬀerentiates the KO call from both a vanilla call and a futures is its
leverage, which is highly sensitive to the underlying's price. Importantly, when a bank
introduces a new KO product it may signiﬁcantly alter the prevailing asymmetries in
the leverages of oﬀered KO calls and KO puts. Since the product with the highest
leverage will turn out to be the most popular product in this market, changes in the
relative leverage of KO calls and KO puts will inﬂuence investors' aggregate exposure.
3 A model of individual investor positions
Consider a three period binomial tree, where t ∈ {0, 1, 2}. There is a single risky
asset, which has a value of St at t. Between periods the risky asset either increases
with a factor of u > 1 or decreases with a factor of d < 1. For the sake of exposition,
we are going to work with an equal probability tree, implying that the probability of
moving up and down the tree between periods is always 1/2. These probabilities also
coincide with the risk-neutral measure, implying that 1 = (d + u)/2, as we abstract
from discounting. We normalize S0 = 1. As a result, S1 ∈ {u, d} and S2 ∈ {u2, ud, d2}.
There are individual investors who cannot trade directly with the underlying but
can purchase warrants from a bank, who prices the warrants fairly. Trading between
the bank and investors takes place in periods t = 0 and t = 1, while in period t = 2
the warrants expire. Those purchasing warrants at t = 0 may resell their warrants to
the bank at t = 1 or hold their warrants until maturity (until t = 2). There are two
warrants oﬀered by the bank: one knock-out call, and one knock-out put.
Investors randomly choose between taking a long or a short position, and pick assets
accordingly. Similarly, they hold on to their chosen assets for a random duration. At
the beginning of trading periods (t = 0, 1) n investors arrive, each endowed with m
money to invest. Each investor independently decides whether to take a long position
or to take a short position, where the probability of going long is 1/2.13 If an investor
chooses to take a long position, she spends her money on knock-out calls, otherwise she
12Note that the parameters used for this ﬁgure are given in Table 8 in Appendix C.
13The results hold for any ﬁxed probability of going long. The crucial assumption is its independence
of the past returns of the underlying.
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purchases knock-out puts. Additionally, a fraction δ ∈ [0, 1] of investors who bought
warrants during t = 0, resell their warrants to the bank during t = 1.
Here is the timing of events:
t = 0 1. S0 is revealed (and normalized to 1).
2. Trading takes place: n investors arrive, who individually randomize between
taking a long or a short position using their funds, m.
t = 1 1. S1 is revealed.
2. Trading takes place: those who purchased securities in period 0 resell them
with probability δ. Additionally, n investors arrive, who individually ran-
domize between taking a long or a short position using their funds, m.
t = 2 1. S2 is revealed.
2. Securities mature and are settled.
In the remainder of this section we ﬁrst analyze investors' trading activity and
aggregate position if they would have access to the futures market. This serves as a
useful benchmark. Second, we turn to the case in which investors are faced with the
two products oﬀered by the bank.
3.1 The futures market as a benchmark
Consider a futures contract that expires at t = 2. The futures contract serves as
a benchmark, which allows us to analyze how investors would trade with futures if
they had access to futures markets.14 Importantly, we assume that a risk neutral
market maker is able to take the other side of investors' net order ﬂow, implying that
individual investors' aggregate demand does not aﬀect prices.
The futures market oﬀers investors the opportunity to take long or short positions
in the underlying risky asset. The value of a futures contract at t is denoted by Ft.
Since we abstract from discounting, the value of the futures always equals to the value
of the underlying, that is Ft = St.
It is standard practice that trading with futures requires a margin account. That
is, if an investor wants to open a futures position (buy or sell futures contracts), she
needs to transfer the initial margin into the margin account as collateral. In reality
the initial margin is typically set between 5% to 10% of the contract's value and its
amount depends on the underlying asset's volatility. Let the initial margin be denoted
by margin. We abstract from margin calls in our setting by assuming that
max{1− d2, u2 − 1} < margin, (2)
that is, the initial margin is large enough to cover all potential losses that may occur
before maturity. For example, if an investor purchases one contract (takes a long
position) at t = 0, she has to post margin× S0 as collateral. In the worst case (from
the investor's perspective), when the underlying depreciates to S2 = d
2, she loses
(1 − d2)S0, which is smaller than the collateral posted by inequality (2). Thus, the
initial margin is large enough to cover even the largest losses.
14Additionally, banks often describe knock-out warrants as futures contracts without the inconve-
nience of margin requirements.
9
Let HFL0 (H
FS
0 ) denote the total number of bought (sold) futures contracts by
investors in period 0. If investors individually randomize between buying and selling
futures contracts, then the expected number of bought and sold contracts satisfy (using
the expected value of the binomial distribution)
E[HFL0 |F0] = E[HFS0 |F0] =
Expected total funds invested
Initial margin× F0 =
nm/2
margin× F0 ,
since the total expected money ﬂowing to buys and sells is nm/2 and the initial margin
requirement is margin. Investors buy and sell more contracts if (i) there is a higher
number of them (higher n) (ii) investors have more money to invest (higher m) and if
the initial margin required / value of a contract is smaller.
Importantly, investors buy and sell the same number of futures contracts in ex-
pectation. This result is consistent with how it is often thought about noise traders,
namely, that they do not systematically buy or sell assets. As a result, on average,
investors do not have an aggregate exposure to the underlying. Volumes of buys and
sells are also symmetric.
The same argument applies for period t = 1. In turn, no matter how the under-
lying evolves, in expectation investors have zero exposure in both trading sessions,
which also implies that their aggregate position does not systematically vary with the
underlying.15
To sum up, we emphasize the conditions required for the above result: (i) margin
requirements for long and short contracts are not correlated with past returns, (ii) in-
vestors' preferences for opening new long (instead of short) positions are not correlated
with past returns and (iii) investors' decision to close a position is not correlated with
past gains/losses. We continue with the discussion of the knock-out warrant market,
where due to diﬀerent product characteristics, condition (i) will no longer hold, leading
to systematic patterns in aggregate investor positions.
3.2 Investors in the warrants market
Consider knock-out warrants. A knock-out call oﬀers long exposure and the knock-
out put oﬀers short exposure. Similarly to the futures discussed above, they expire at
t = 2. Importantly, we assume that the strikes and barriers satisfy
Kcall = Bcall < d2 ≤ u2 < Bput = Kput, (3)
where Kcall (Kput) is the strike price of the call (put) and Bcall (Bput) is the barrier
of the call (put). Setting the barriers equal to the strikes helps our exposition, while
setting the barriers outside of the underlying's range simpliﬁes derivations, since it
guarantees that no knock-out events occur before maturity (this is similar to inequality
(2), which eliminates margin calls from the setup).16 As a consequence, the payoﬀ of
the warrants coincide with the payoﬀ of vanilla options.
The call's payoﬀ at t = 2 is
C2 = S2 −Kcall
15Note that this last statement would also hold if margin requirements would be diﬀerent for long
and short positions (but constant over time).
16This is also the empirically relevant case, as investors can only trade actively with a warrant until
it has not been knocked-out.
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while the put's payoﬀ is
P2 = K
put − S2.
Following the simple structure, it is straightforward to determine the fair prices
of the warrants for t = 0, 1. In particular, the solutions are Ct = St − Kcall and
Pt = K
put − St.17
E.g. if S1 = u, then under the risk-neutral measure
C1 = E[C2|S1 = u] = E[S2 −Kcall|S1 = u] = (u2 + ud)/2−Kcall = u−Kcall.
One of the features that separates futures markets from bank issued knock-out
warrants is that in the latter investors are not required to post margins as investors
cannot lose more than the invested amount.
Now consider the distribution of trading activity. Let HCt (H
P
t ) denote the gross
number of calls (puts) that investors purchase from the bank at t. During t = 0, the
expected number of calls and puts bought by investors is (where the expectation is
over individual investors' randomization over going long or short)
E[HC0 |S0] =
nm
2C0
=
nm
2(S0 −Kcall) , E[H
P
0 |S0] =
nm
2P0
=
nm
2(Kput − S0) ,
that is, all else equal, investors purchase higher number of contracts if (i) there are a
higher number of investors (higher n), (ii) investors have more money to spend (higher
m) and (iii) if the given product is cheaper (lower C0 or lower P0). Since all warrants
are priced fairly, the expected proﬁt of purchasing any calls or puts is zero. However,
their payoﬀ, in general, depends on the evolution of the risky asset (St), implying that
they have exposure to the underlying. Interestingly, the exposure a contract oﬀers is
independent of its price, since option payoﬀs are linear in the underlying. Formally,
let V be the value of investors' warrants at the end of period t = 0,
V0 = H
C
0 (S0 −Kcall) +HP0 (Kput − S0).
We deﬁne EXPt as investors' aggregate exposure (to which we will also refer as
investors' aggregate position) to the underlying at the end of period t (that is, after
investors' purchase decisions), which, at t = 0, is equal to
EXP0 =
∆V0
∆S0
= HC0 −HP0 . (4)
Equation (4) can be interpreted as follows. Suppose investors hold HC0 calls and
HP0 puts at the end of period t = 0, and the price of the underlying, S0, increases
by one unit. Then the aggregate value of investors' portfolio increases by HC0 −HP0 .
Thus, an additional call (put) contract increases (decreases) investors' exposure by one
unit, irrespective of the contract's properties (i.e. barriers and strikes). This implies
that buying a cheap contract has the same eﬀect on investors' exposure as buying an
expensive one. The expectation of exposure is equal to
E[EXP0|S0] = E[HC0 |S0]− E[HP0 |S0] =
nm
2
Kcall +Kput − 2S0
(S0 −Kcall)(Kput − S0) (5)
17In this setup the warrants are similar to real life knock-out warrants, since their value also falls
close to their intrinsic value.
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Since the denominator in (5) is always positive, the sign of the aggregate exposure
depends on the level of the strikes, Kcall and Kput, relative to S0. When K
call and/or
Kput is relatively large (but still satisfying the inequalities in (3)) then the exposure
is positive: if the underlying increases the combined value of the warrants increases.
The intuition is simple. When kcall and/or Kput is relatively large then the price
of a call, C0 will be small compared to the price of a put, P0. This results in an
investor portfolio consisting of more call contracts than put contracts, in expectation.
Hence, investors, on average, gain if the underlying increases and lose if the underlying
decreases. Investors' expected exposure is only zero if S0 is the arithmetic mean of the
strikes, as in that case the calls and puts trade at the same price.
Now consider the trading session at t = 1. The new traders take positions similarly
as before, implying that the expected change in investors' aggregate position from t = 0
to t = 1 will be
E[EXP1 − EXP0|S1, S0] =
nm
2
[
Kcall +Kput − 2S1
(S1 −Kcall)(Kput − S1) − δ
Kcall +Kput − 2S0
(S0 −Kcall)(Kput − S0)
]
(6)
where E[EXP1|S1, S0] is the expected exposure of investors at the end of t = 1,
conditional on the history of the underlying and δ is the fraction of investors who
choose to resell their warrants to the bank before they expire.18 The ﬁrst term in
brackets corresponds to the total exposure of those investors who arrived in period
1, while the second term captures resells of investors who arrived in period 0. It is
clear from (6) that when S1 = d is realized, then the price of the call depreciates, and,
simultaneously, the price of the put appreciates. Thus, investors who arrive in period
1 take a longer position compared to period 0 investors because calls are now relatively
cheaper than previously. Similarly, when S1 = u is realized, investors decrease their
aggregate position. Thus, investors aggregate position suggests that they bet on price
reversals.
The following proposition summarizes the main predictions from the model:
Proposition 1 1. Share of transactions involving calls does not depend on past
returns.
2. Share of call contract trading value is positively correlated with past returns,
Cov
[
[δHC0 +H
C
1 ]C1
nm+ δ[HC0 C1 +H
P
0 P1]
, S1 − S0
]
> 0.
3. Share of call contract volumes is negatively correlated with past returns,
Cov
[
δHC0 +H
C
1
HC1 +H
P
1 + δ[H
C
0 +H
P
0 ]
, S1 − S0
]
< 0.
4. Investors bet on price reversals, implying Cov[EXP1 − EXP0, S1 − S0] < 0
18Note that expectations are taken over individual randomizations on whether to take a long or a
short position.
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The proofs are straightforward, and shown in Appendix A. Since investors individ-
ually randomize between taking long or short positions and the probability of reselling
warrants to the bank is independent of past returns, the share of transactions involving
calls does not depend on past returns.
The second statement is that the share of call contract value (value of exchanged
call contracts normalized by the total value of exchanged call and put contracts) is
increasing with past returns. The intuition for this result is that if the underlying
appreciates, the value of calls held by investors increases relative to puts. In turn,
since the selling decision is independent of past returns, the calls resold by investors
will have higher value than the puts.
Third, the share of call contract volume is decreasing with past returns. The idea
is that after appreciations of the underlying call contracts become relatively more ex-
pensive, implying that for the same amount of investment, investors can only purchase
a lower number of call contracts.
Finally, investors take positions as if they were betting on price reversals. This
is the most surprising prediction of the model, given that purchasing and selling de-
cisions are independent of past returns. Since the price of calls (puts) is monotone
increasing (decreasing) in the underlying, if the underlying increases puts are going to
be cheaper than calls and this will lead new investors to purchase a higher number of
puts, eﬀectively betting on a reversal.
It is important to emphasize that these results are conditional on not hitting any
of the barriers, as we have assumed in (3). The moment a barrier is hit, investors'
position will be closed automatically, implying that in that moment they are (passively)
reinforcing market movements. However, our focus is on understanding investors'
purchasing and reselling decisions, which are also conditional on a warrant being prior
to a knock-out event.
To conclude, while the exposure individual investors may take with calls and puts
is very similar to the exposure provided by futures, the contract features of knock-out
warrants are ﬁxed in the short-run, which leads to an asymmetry of product character-
istics between oﬀered calls and puts. In turn, if individual investors allocate their funds
randomly, their aggregate exposure will systematically vary with the asymmetries of
the available menu. While the asymmetries in this simpliﬁed setup are only driven by
the evolution of the underlying, in reality banks have the option to strategically time
the introduction of new warrants, which gives them the (potentially valuable) power
to inﬂuence individual investors' aggregate position.
4 Empirical analysis
We have obtained transactions data from a bank on KO calls and puts that have
the German DAX index as their underlying. Our data consists of all transactions
that took place between the bank and investors from December 2013 to April 2014
(100 trading days) and includes all KOs issued on the DAX by our bank during this
period.19 There were 6 KO calls and 4 KO puts actively traded in the given sample
period (see Figure 2). For each transaction we can observe a time stamp, the number
of contracts exchanged, the price per contract and, most importantly, the sign of the
19I.e. investor-investor transactions are not recorded, as the bank did not participate in these.
Investor-investor transactions happen when investors submit orders that cross within the bid and ask
prices set by the bank.
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trade. That is, we know whether investors bought contracts from or resold contracts
to the issuing bank. This allows us to analyze investors' aggregate position in all issues
throughout our sample.
Table 1 provides descriptives for the transactions data. Note that we have omitted
settlement transactions occurring after maturity (3 issues) or a knock-out event (4
issues). For both calls and puts there are more transactions in which investors purchase
contracts than resell contracts. Nevertheless, the large number of investor sells suggests
that the holding period of these products is short and that the majority of investors
does not wait until maturity.
The median transaction exchanges contracts worth around e 500, while the mean
value is over e 1600, suggesting a highly skewed distribution. Also, sell transactions
are larger, on average, for both calls and puts, which is consistent with investors'
higher willingness to realize gains than losses.
KO puts are slightly more popular among investors than calls, which is likely to
reﬂect that it is more diﬃcult to ﬁnd adequate substitutes for puts. However, the
leverages of calls and puts are similarly high, above 13, on average and also vary a lot,
with standard deviations above 4.
For the analysis we restrict the sample by focusing on the highest levered call
issue and highest levered put issue on any given day. As Figure 8 shows, the highest
leveraged product is, by far, the most popular one.20 This implies that whenever
a bank issues a new call or put that has higher leverage than the already available
ones, it is likely to attract most of the trading activity. Additionally, we omit the
largest transactions by dropping buy transactions who's value exceeds e 33333 and
sell transactions who's volume exceeds 4000 contracts. These approximately constitute
the top percentile of their respective distributions.
Table 2 shows the descriptives of the selected sample. By keeping the highest
levered products on each day we loose about 11% of the transactions. The mean value
and volume of contracts decreases due to the elimination of the largest trades, while
they increase as a result of eliminating lower levered issues.
We aggregate our data to the daily level, where we carry out our main analysis.
Descriptives are provided in Table 3. Using our selected sample, we compute the total
number of contracts bought and sold by investors during day t of issue i and also
their diﬀerence. Similarly, we count the buy and sell transactions and their diﬀerence.
This leaves us with 100 observations for calls and puts each. Note that the diﬀerence
between buys and sells has a standard deviation similar to buys and sells, which
suggests that buys and sells are positively correlated, i.e. day trading gives a signiﬁcant
portion of the volume. Nevertheless, on a median (and mean) day, investors tend
to purchase more contracts than sell, which suggests that at least some investors
undertake longer holding periods. This is also conﬁrmed, for example, by Figure 1,
which indicates large persistence of investors' aggregate position.
To measure the asymmetry in the menu of oﬀered contracts, we deﬁne DLevt as
the diﬀerence between the Log leverages of the highest levered call and put:
DLevt = ln
(
St
St −Kcall
)
− ln
(
St
Kput − St
)
,
where St is the closing price of the underlying and K
call (Kput) is the strike of the high-
est levered call (put). We refer to DLevt as the leverage diﬀerential. Its distribution
20Note that the result also holds if trading activity is measured by the number of transactions or
the trading value.
14
is shown in Table 3, while its evolution is also illustrated on Figure 3. Additionally,
Table 3 also shows the distribution of the (log) returns on the DAX index (×100)
during our sample period.
In order to disentangle the eﬀects of past returns and the asymmetric menu of the
oﬀered contracts we estimate the following speciﬁcation on the daily data:
Buysi,t − Sellsi,t = β1RDAXt−1 + β2Puti ×RDAXt−1 + γ1DLevt−1 + γ2Puti ×DLevt−1+
δXi,t−1 + α(i) + it, (7)
where i identiﬁes the warrant issue and t is the date. The dependent variable is the
net purchase of investors measured by the diﬀerence between the total number of
contracts bought (Buysi,t) and sold (Sellsi,t) during day t. R
DAX
t−1 is the return of the
DAX index from the close of t − 2 to the close of t − 1. Puti is an indicator for the
issue being a put and DLevt−1 is the leverage diﬀerential at the closing time of the
previous trading day.21 A set of controls known at t− 1 including the Puti indicator,
the total number of outstanding contracts of issue i, days since issuance and days to
maturity are included in Xi,t−1. The constant term may be issue-speciﬁc, i.e. (7) may
be estimated using ﬁxed-eﬀects.
If investors systematically bet on price reversals, as predicted by our model, we
expect β1 < 0 and β1 + β2 > 0. That is, following an increase in the DAX index,
investors should decrease their holdings of call contracts and increase their holdings of
put contracts.
Parameters γ1 and γ2 capture the mechanical eﬀect leading to Proposition 1. If
investors allocate their funds randomly we expect γ1 > 0 and γ1 + γ2 < 0, that is,
when a higher leverage diﬀerential leads investors to purchase a higher number of call
contracts as they are relatively cheap compared to the oﬀered put contract.
4.1 Results
Does investors' aggregate position systematically vary with the available menu of con-
tracts and/or with past returns? We have already shown that the most levered prod-
ucts are the most popular ones within puts and within calls (Figure 8). Now we turn
to the more interesting question, whether asymmetries in the product characteristics
of the oﬀered calls and puts systematically aﬀects the position investors take.
Table 4 presents the benchmark results of estimating 7. Estimates from column
(1) conﬁrm the prediction of Proposition 1. Investors, on the aggregate bet on price
reversals. A 1% percent increase in the DAX index (which also happens to be close
to its standard deviation) is associated with investors selling 1829 call contracts and
buying similar number of put contracts (the raw standard deviation of the dependent
variable is 8300 contracts) during the next trading day, leading to a net change in their
position of over 3600 contracts.
Controlling for asymmetric leverage and product characteristics (column (2)) shrinks
this association by almost a third. That is, investors tend to purchase a higher (lower)
number of call (put) contracts when the leverage of the highest levered call is higher
21DLevt−1 is also the approximate diﬀerence between the put's and call's price. A call contract's
price can be approximated by Ct ≈ St−Kcall and its leverage by CLevt ≈ St/(St−Kcall). Similarly,
a put contract's price is close to Pt ≈ Kput − St and its leverage PLevt ≈ St/(Kput − St). It follows
that DLevt−1 = lnCLevt − lnPLevt = lnPt − lnCt .
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than the leverage of the highest levered put. Adding issue ﬁxed eﬀects further reduces
the association. The results suggest that about two ﬁfths of the association between
past returns and investor activity is due to the asymmetric menu of oﬀered contracts.
The last two columns of Table 4 decompose the results to investors' buying and
selling activity. These suggest that past returns signiﬁcantly inﬂuence investors' sell-
ing decisions while playing no role in their purchasing decisions. To the contrary,
asymmetric leverages play a more important role in the purchasing decision.
Taken together, investors tend to bet on price reversals. However, part of this
eﬀect is mechanical: even if they were to randomly allocate their funds between the
highest levered call and put, the result would follow. Nevertheless, their selling decision
reinforces the eﬀect: after increases (decreases) in the DAX index, investors tend to
sell a higher number of call (put) contracts, taking proﬁts. This is consistent with the
well documented disposition eﬀect.
Is there heterogeneity in the results? To address this, we rerun the regressions
of Table 4 on large and small trades, separately. Results are tabulated in Tables
5-6. We deﬁne large (small) trades as a transaction involving over (at most) 200
contracts, which roughly corresponds to the 75th percentile of its distribution, i.e.
75% of transactions involve less than 200 contracts. However, dividing the sample
this way proxies for relatively wealthier investors in a noisy fashion. It would be a
perfect proxy if investors who purchase at most (over) 200 contracts always sell at
most (over) 200 contracts with a transaction. If investors build up their positions over
time with multiple transactions below the 200 threshold and sell all of their contracts
(the total exceeding 200) with a single transaction, then their purchasing activity is
(mis)classiﬁed as small and their selling is classiﬁed as large.22
The estimates in Tables 5-6 suggest signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the behavior
of wealthier and less wealthier investors. First, the asymmetric menu accounts for a
larger fraction of the observed association between past returns and investors' positions
when it comes to wealthier/larger traders. In particular, for larger traders it accounts
for about half of the association (symmetrically for calls and puts) while for smaller
traders it does not aﬀect the slope for put contracts and accounts for less than half for
calls. This suggests that people betting in smaller amounts are more heavily inﬂuenced
by past returns.
Second, smaller traders' purchasing decisions are also inﬂuenced by past returns
while larger traders' is not. The estimates in Table 6 imply that even after controlling
for the asymmetries in the available menu, smaller investors bet on price reversals by
purchasing more calls (puts) after recent negative (positive) returns of the DAX.
Since the value of transactions is heavily skewed, one concern is that the bench-
mark results might be driven my the behavior of a few large investors/trades, even
after eliminating the largest trades from the sample. For example, sorting (investors
purchasing) transactions into deciles by the number of contracts involved, one ﬁnds
that the top quartile of transactions (i.e. transactions involving over 200 contracts)
accounts for over 80% of the volume. Therefore, as a robustness check, we count the
purchasing and selling transactions by each day and issue and rerun the regressions
using the diﬀerence between purchasing and reselling transactions as a dependent vari-
able. This gives equal weight to each transaction, i.e. overweighting the behavior of
small traders.
22Similarly, if investors buy over 200 contracts with a single transaction and sell oﬀ their contracts
in smaller than 200 bundles, their buying activity would be classiﬁed as large while their selling as
small.
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Table 7 shows the results. The results are qualitatively closest to the results on
small trades (Table 6). That is, past returns seem to play an important role both in
the purchasing and in the selling decision even after controlling for the asymmetric
leverage of calls and puts. Surprisingly, though, the leverage diﬀerential enters the ﬁxed
eﬀects speciﬁcations signiﬁcantly. This suggests that investors place buy orders more
frequently (compared to sell orders) if the product is oﬀering relatively high leverage.
In other words, investors consider the relative leverage of calls and puts when deciding
on the direction of their bets, which goes against our assumption that investors choose
the side of their bets randomly. The eﬀect is also asymmetric: for puts its negligible
while for calls it is large. This would imply that there are numerous, albeit relatively
small, speculators, who take long positions if the leverage of the highest levered call is
suﬃciently high and do not consider taking short positions.
To take advantage of our transaction level data, we plot the within day distribution
of transactions on Figure 9. Most transactions occur right after the exchange opens
and just before the exchange closes for the day. In particular, due to day trading, the
propensity to buy is largest in the morning hours and the propensity to sell is largest
during the hours before closing.
Figure 10 breaks down trading intensities by the sign of the within day return of
the underlying. Consistent with the disposition eﬀect, investors are more likely to
submit sell orders for calls during the afternoon if the underlying's price increased
within the day. Similarly, they are more likely to sell puts during the afternoon if the
price decreased during the day. This pattern suggests that day traders are also prone
to the disposition eﬀect.
5 Discussion
The data conﬁrms our main hypothesis of investors betting on price reversals. The
asymmetric leverage of oﬀered call and put warrants induces investors to bet on price
reversals, on aggregate, even if they were to choose the direction of their bets randomly
at the individual level. In addition, the data suggests that individuals bet on price
reversals even after controlling for the mechanical channel.
The results are also consistent with investors' sensation seeking. Kumar (2009)
demonstrates that individual investors who are likely to participate in state lotteries
are also more likely to be drawn to high volatility (lottery-type) assets in ﬁnancial
markets. Analyzing individual investors' portfolio using data from a German bro-
kerage in addition to survey data, Dorn and Sengmueller (2009) show that investors
who enjoy gambling trade more frequently. Investors are also more likely to gamble
on ﬁnancial markets when other alternatives are less appealing. Dorn et al. (2014)
provides evidence from both the US and Germany suggesting that lower prizes on
national lotteries is associated with an increase of small trades in speculative stocks.
That is, individual investors substitute between gambling on lotteries and gambling
on ﬁnancial markets. We also provide suggestive evidence on sensation seeking. In
particular, the estimates of Table 7 suggest that investors tend to place long bets more
frequently if the leverage of the (highest levered) call warrant is larger. That is, higher
leverage attracts more bets.
We ﬁnd that past returns strongly inﬂuence the selling decision of investors. Our
results are consistent with the well documented disposition eﬀect. Using data on
individual investors' trading accounts provided by a brokerage, Odean (1998) ﬁnds
that investors have a much stronger tendency (a disposition) to sell winner stocks from
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their portfolios than losers. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) provides evidence for the
disposition eﬀect from Finland. Dhar and Zhu (2006) and Feng and Seasholes (2005)
argue that the disposition eﬀect is weaker for sophisticated/wealthier investors. We
complement these papers by providing evidence for the disposition eﬀect in a setting
where taking long and short positions is equally convenient for individual investors
by using KO warrants. We show that the disposition eﬀect is present on both sides.
Individuals tend to sell more calls (puts) after recent increases (decreases) in the
underlying. That is, they are more likely to sell their warrants after it has appreciated.
We also provide suggestive evidence that smaller investors are more heavily inﬂuenced
by past returns. In particular, we show that investors who gamble in smaller amounts,
tend to bet on price reversals, i.e. they purchase more calls (puts) after declines
(increases) in the underlying. This holds after controlling for leverage. On the other
hand, past returns seem to have similar eﬀects on the selling decisions of both larger
and smaller investors.
If a fraction of investors believe that the underlying's price exhibits mean reversion,
then betting on price reversals is a legitimate strategy (before transaction costs), which
would directly lead to our empirical results. There is evidence from lab experiments
suggesting that people mistakingly extrapolate random series. Andreassen and Kraus
(1990) ﬁnd that if people familiar with basic economics are presented with a sample
series of a stock price that has a visible trend, subjects are likely to extrapolate that
trend. Also, if the presented series does not exhibit a trend, people extrapolated mean
reversion. Weber and Camerer (1998) and more recently Jiao (2017) also use lab
experiments to determine the possible mechanisms that lead to the disposition eﬀect
and present evidence in favor of biased beliefs toward mean reversion.
The two competing explanations in Jiao (2017) are the preference based explana-
tion and the belief based explanation. While the belief in mean reversion falls in the
latter, prospect theory is the most prominent candidate in explaining the disposition
eﬀect. In particular, when risk attitudes are diﬀerent for gains and losses, investors
might be risk seeking if they hold losers and therefore choose not to sell the loser. On
the other hand, in the domain of gains, investors might be more risk-averse, which in-
duces them to close their positions. Jiao (2017) provides evidence for the belief based
explanation. The disposition eﬀect is strongest in those subjects who predict more
mean reversion.
Our evidence is also consistent with investor overconﬁdence. Tables 6-7 and Fig-
ure 10 suggest that purchase decisions  especially for calls  are aﬀected by past
returns. Investors' decision to buy also depends on within day movements. In partic-
ular, investors seem to be following a "double down" strategy: they are more likely
to purchase calls and puts at the end of the day if their respective values declined
during the day. This is consistent with the hypothesis of Ben-David and Hirshleifer
(2012), who suggest the following description of an overconﬁdent investor: when the
price of the chosen product rises, overconﬁdent investors believe that everything went
as planned and realize the gains. However, when the chosen product depreciates, over-
conﬁdent investors now see an even bigger opportunity to gain, therefore they increase
their holdings of the given product.
6 Concluding remarks
We analyze individual investors' trading activity, focusing on how past returns aﬀect
their aggregate order ﬂow in the market of knock-out warrants. This market is at-
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tractive to carry out such an analysis as individuals are arguably the only traders
and taking long and short positions in a given underlying is equally convenient for
investors.
Our results suggest that past returns play an important role in investors' trading
activity. Even after controlling for mechanical eﬀects due to the asymmetric leverages
of oﬀered contracts we ﬁnd that investors' aggregate trading activity is consistent with
them betting on price reversals. More detailed analysis reveals that this is mostly due
to their selling decisions, that is, investors are more likely to sell warrants after they
have appreciated. This ﬁnding is consistent with the disposition eﬀect. Additional
results suggest that smaller investors actively bet on price reversals through their
purchasing decisions, especially after depreciations of the underlying.
The main limitations of the paper are that we cannot link transactions to individ-
uals (and their characteristics) and also that we do not consider the strategic behavior
of the supply side, but assume that it is competitive.It is plausible that the behavior of
individual investors inﬂuences bank's strategies. E.g. banks may strategically time the
introduction of new warrants and they may strategically set quotes for their products.
For purposes of risk and/or liquidity management banks might be inclined to design
products that leave individual investors systematically exposed to the underlying, on
average. Also, since the bank has the information advantage of knowing the number
of outstanding contracts, it may ﬁnd it optimal to use this information when setting
its quotes, which also aﬀects investor positions. Hence, a better understanding of the
supply side would be a natural next step.
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.
1. By deﬁnition, the share of transactions involving calls is i.i.d. and the probability
of resells, δ, is also independent of all variables.
2. Using that E[S1 − S0] = 0, the covariance may be written as
E
[
[δHC0 +H
C
1 ]C1
nm+ δ[HC0 C1 +H
P
0 P1]
(S1 − S0)
]
, (1)
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Let the share of call contract trading value be denoted by f(S1, L0, L1), where Lt
is the number of traders who arrive in period t and decide to open a long position
(they are binomially distributed i.i.d. random variables). The expectation in (1)
will always be positive because taking L0 and L1 ﬁxed the expectation can be
written as
1
2
(u− 1)[f(u, L¯0, L¯1)− f(d, L¯0, L¯1)]
which will always be positive as f(·) is increasing in S1. Since this holds for all
realized values of L0 and L1, it also holds in expectation.
3. The proof follows the same logic as the previous one.
4. The covariance may be written as
E
[(
HC1 −HP1 − δ(HC0 −HP0 )
)
(S1 − S0)
]
= E
[(
HC1 −HP1
)
(S1 − S0)
]
where the equality follows from the fact that L0 and S1 are independent, that is
E[(HC0 −HP0 )(S1 − S0)] = (HC0 −HP0 )E[S1 − S0] = 0. Then for all realizations
of L1, the covariance simpliﬁes to
1
2
(u− 1)
[
L1m
u−Kcall −
L1m
d−Kcall +
(n− L1)m
Kput − d −
(n− L1)m
Kput − u
]
,
which is always negative as d < u.
B Tables and Figures
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of transaction level data, whole sample. This table
shows the distribution of selected variables for all investor initiated transactions. Set-
tlement transactions following maturity or a knock-out event are excluded. Variables
are deﬁned from the investors' perspective, i.e. "Value of buys" corresponds to the
number of euros paid by the investor as part of a transaction in which the investor
bought contracts from the issuing bank.
Obs Mean Stdev p10 p50 p75 p99
Call contracts
Value of buys (euros) 5284 1624 4762 117 519 1271 19566
Value of sells (euros) 4005 2028 5199 122 613 1589 23190
Leverage of buys 5284 13 4.5 8.1 12 15 26
Volume of buys (# of contracts) 5284 204 674 15 65 157 2400
Volume of sells (# of contracts) 4005 244 712 15 76 200 3000
Put contracts
Value of buys (euros) 6537 1881 6478 98 472 1286 23153
Value of sells (euros) 4754 2463 7734 120 574 1668 34238
Leverage of buys 6537 14 4.9 9.2 14 17 32
Volume of buys (# of contracts) 6537 277 1032 15 63 200 3000
Volume of sells (# of contracts) 4754 349 1237 18 90 200 5000
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of transaction level data, selected sample. This table
shows the statistics of Table 1 for the selected sample. The following transactions are
excluded: investor buys exceeding 33333 euros, investor sells exceeding 4000 contracts
and transactions involving an issue that's leverage is not the highest within calls or
puts.
Obs Mean Stdev p25 p50 p75 p99
Call contracts
Value of buys (euros) 4615 1411 2831 238 515 1243 15627
Value of sells (euros) 3427 1749 3406 258 604 1576 18469
Leverage of buys 4615 14 4.4 10 12 16 26
Volume of buys (# of contracts) 4615 182 381 30 69 170 2000
Volume of sells (# of contracts) 3427 216 422 30 80 200 2400
Put contracts
Value of buys (euros) 5885 1611 3411 211 480 1295 19547
Value of sells (euros) 4323 1837 3664 258 574 1638 19967
Leverage of buys 5885 14 5 11 14 17 33
Volume of buys (# of contracts) 5885 233 522 30 69 200 2500
Volume of sells (# of contracts) 4323 244 453 40 90 200 2300
Table 3: Descriptive statistics, daily data, selected sample. This table shows descrip-
tives for the sample included in Table 2, aggregated at the daily level.
Obs. Mean Stdev p10 p50 p90
RDAXt 100 .016 1.1 -1.5 .039 1.4
DLevt 100 -.2 .58 -.92 -.31 .56
Call contracts
Buys (# of contracts) 100 8400 7904 1266 6072 18517
Sells (# of contracts) 100 7393 6198 1082 5575 17450
Buys-Sells (# of contracts) 100 1007 5670 -4455 763 6118
Buys (# of transactions) 100 46 34 13 38 103
Sells (# of transactions) 100 34 22 10 29 68
Buys-Sells (# of transactions) 100 12 27 -18 8 50
Put contracts
Buys (# of contracts) 100 13685 10116 3927 10516 25893
Sells (# of contracts) 100 10560 8908 2111 7423 24837
Buys-Sells (# of contracts) 100 3125 10070 -7758 2678 14292
Buys (# of transactions) 100 59 27 26 55 93
Sells (# of transactions) 100 43 27 17 34 81
Buys-Sells (# of transactions) 100 16 36 -26 13 58
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Table 4: Benchmark results. Buysi,t (Sellsi,t) is the total number of contracts bought
(sold) during day t by investors of issue i. RDAXt−1 is the log return of the DAX index
from the close of t− 2 to the close of t− 1 times 100. Puti is an indicator for the issue
being a put (and is also included separately in all speciﬁcations but omitted from the
tables) and DLevt−1 is the diﬀerence between the (log) leverages of the highest levered
call and put at the closing time of the previous trading day. A set of controls known
at t − 1 including the total number of outstanding contracts of issue i (only known
by the bank), days since issuance and days to maturity are included in Xi,t−1. We
report p-values from F-tests for the joint signiﬁcance of RDAXt−1 / PUTi ×RDAXt−1 and of
DLevt−1/PUTi ×DLevt−1, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Buysit− Buysit− Buysit−
VARIABLES Sellsit Sellsit Sellsit Buysit Sellsit
RDAXt−1 -1,829*** -1,372** -1,026*** -347.2 678.5**
(458.0) (598.0) (177.9) (310.0) (241.5)
PUTi ×RDAXt−1 3,660*** 2,466** 2,118** -515.6 -2,634***
(916.9) (977.5) (776.9) (902.3) (352.6)
DLevt−1 3,639** 4,857*** 9,958*** 5,102**
(1,624) (981.5) (1,249) (1,379)
PUTi ×DLevt−1 -9,630*** -12,010*** -14,461*** -2,451
(3,442) (2,766) (2,600) (1,965)
Observations 196 196 196 196 196
R-squared 0.070 0.183 0.142 0.209 0.250
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Issue FE No No Yes Yes Yes
F-test β1 = β2 = 0 (p-val) 0.000 0.030 0.003 0.179 0.000
F-test γ1 = γ2 = 0 (p-val) 0.021 0.007 0.000 0.015
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: Results: large trades. Buysli,t (Sells
l
i,t) is the total number of contracts
bought (sold) during day t by investors of issue i using transactions involving over 200
contracts. See Table 4 for other variables' deﬁnitions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Buyslit− Buyslit− Buyslit−
VARIABLES Sellslit Sells
l
it Sells
l
it Buys
l
it Sells
l
it
RDAXt−1 -1,371*** -1,035** -745.5** -151.3 594.3**
(365.0) (484.7) (222.5) (355.4) (236.5)
PUTi ×RDAXt−1 2,764*** 1,664** 1,372* -772.0 -2,144***
(751.3) (803.0) (684.7) (874.0) (360.1)
DLevt−1 2,765** 3,733*** 7,765*** 4,032**
(1,396) (984.2) (920.5) (1,257)
PUTi ×DLevt−1 -8,578*** -10,527*** -11,951*** -1,423
(3,020) (2,328) (2,252) (1,836)
Observations 196 196 196 196 196
R-squared 0.064 0.180 0.130 0.183 0.220
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Issue FE No No Yes Yes Yes
F-test β1 = β2 = 0 (p-val) 0.000 0.070 0.041 0.286 0.002
F-test γ1 = γ2 = 0 (p-val) 0.018 0.011 0.000 0.016
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 6: Results: small trades. Buyssi,t (Sells
s
i,t) is the total number of contracts
bought (sold) during day t by investors of issue i using transactions involving at most
200 contracts. See Table 4 for other variables' deﬁnitions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Buyssit− Buyssit− Buyssit−
VARIABLES Sellssit Sells
s
it Sells
s
it Buys
s
it Sells
s
it
RDAXt−1 -458.4*** -336.9** -280.2** -195.9** 84.27**
(143.8) (160.5) (83.84) (61.84) (31.70)
PUTi ×RDAXt−1 895.0*** 802.0*** 746.1*** 256.5** -489.6***
(234.0) (244.9) (145.4) (100.4) (52.04)
DLevt−1 874.3** 1,124** 2,193*** 1,070***
(380.3) (342.2) (498.1) (237.8)
PUTi ×DLevt−1 -1,052* -1,482* -2,510*** -1,027**
(595.0) (672.8) (675.4) (368.8)
Observations 196 196 196 196 196
R-squared 0.065 0.170 0.157 0.239 0.306
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Issue FE No No Yes Yes Yes
F-test β1 = β2 = 0 (p-val) 0.001 0.005 0.006 0.051 0.000
F-test γ1 = γ2 = 0 (p-val) 0.073 0.045 0.012 0.010
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7: Results: transactions. This table reports the results for transactions. Buystri,t
(Sellstri,t) is the total number of transactions during day t through which investors
purchase (sell) any number of contracts of issue i. All transactions are considered
for the highest levered call and highest levered put. See Table 4 for other variables'
deﬁnitions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Buystrit− Buystrit− Buystrit−
VARIABLES Sellstrit Sells
tr
it Sells
tr
it Buys
tr
it Sells
tr
it
RDAXt−1 -8.369*** -6.732** -5.711*** -4.343*** 1.368*
(2.408) (2.666) (1.361) (1.042) (0.585)
PUTi ×RDAXt−1 17.66*** 16.36*** 15.68*** 6.274*** -9.406***
(4.186) (4.374) (2.515) (1.417) (1.321)
DLevt−1 12.18** 16.01** 33.49*** 17.48***
(5.993) (4.584) (6.688) (3.702)
PUTi ×DLevt−1 -15.34 -19.98* -36.25*** -16.27**
(9.948) (8.356) (8.013) (6.258)
Observations 196 196 196 196 196
R-squared 0.089 0.179 0.172 0.224 0.274
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Issue FE No No Yes Yes Yes
F-test β1 = β2 = 0 (p-val) 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.010 0.001
F-test γ1 = γ2 = 0 (p-val) 0.129 0.036 0.007 0.007
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 1: The evolution of the DAX index (solid line, right axis) and investors' aggre-
gate position. Investors' aggregate position is the diﬀerence between the total number
of call contracts and put contracts investors hold at the end of the day.
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Figure 2: DAX index and oﬀered knock-out warrants during our sample. Dashed hor-
izontal segments indicate the lifespan of knock-out put contracts represented by their
barriers. Solid horizontal segments indicate the lifespan of knock-out call contracts
represented by their barriers. After introduction, warrants either get knocked-out (4
cases) or expire at maturity (3 cases). In three cases the products only expired after
our sample period ended.
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Figure 3: Relative leverage of oﬀered call and put warrants and investors' aggregate
position. Relative leverage (solid line, right axis) is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between
the Log leverage of the highest levered call and the Log leverage of the highest lev-
ered put, where leverage is the absolute percent change in the warrants value if the
underlying changes by one percent. Investors' aggregate position (dashed line) is the
diﬀerence between the total number of call contracts and put contracts investors hold
at the end of the day.
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Figure 4: Leverage of a KO call, a vanilla call and a futures contract as a function
of the underlying's price. Leverage is deﬁned as an elasticity of the derivative's value
with respect to the underlying's price. Note that option leverages were numerically
approximated based on the Black-Scholes model. Parameters used are provided in
Table 8. For the leverage of the futures, we have assumed a margin of 10%.
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Figure 5: Value and leverage of a KO call and a KO put as a function of the strike
price of the oﬀered KO call. Parameters for the KO put are K = 9000, B = 8750,
while for the KO call the barrier is always set to B = K + 250. Parameters common
to both products are S = 8450, rf = 0, T = 1, σ = 0.2. Model implied values are
based on Black-Scholes assumptions.
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Figure 6: Example of product issuance. This ﬁgure shows the number of active warrant
issues, that have the WTI Oil price as their underlying, together with the evolution of
the underlying's price (right axis).
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
25
0
VW
 s
to
ck
 p
ric
e
0
1
2
3
4
5
N
um
be
r o
f a
ct
ive
 V
W
 w
ar
ra
nt
 is
su
es
01jan2010 01jan2012 01jan2014 01jan2016
Number of active VW warrant issues
VW stock price (right axis)
Figure 7: Example of product issuance. This ﬁgure shows the number of active warrant
issues, that have the Volkswagen stock price as their underlying, together with the
evolution of the underlying's price (right axis).
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Figure 8: Total volume (# of contracts) by leverage order. This chart shows the
total volume in our sample, separately for calls and puts, over the leverage order of
available warrants. Note that only those trading days were considered when at least
two diﬀerent calls and puts were available.
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Figure 9: Investors' trading activity within trading hours. This graph shows the
average number of buy transactions and resell transactions investors carry out with
the bank.
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Figure 10: Investors' trading activity within trading hours by within day market
movement. This graph shows the average number of buy and resell transactions by the
hour of day, computed separately for days when the DAX index increased during the
day (Close-Open>0) and decreased during the day (Close-Open<0). Solid (dashed)
lines correspond to calls (puts) while thick (thin) lines correspond to days when the
DAX increased (decreased) within the day.
C The Delta and Vega of a KO call
In order to build some intuition for the pricing of KO products, it is useful to compare
the behavior of their model implied prices to futures prices and to European vanilla
option prices. These comparisons are useful because banks market these products
by advertising that they have similar characteristics to futures, except that once the
barrier is hit, their positions are automatically closed, so the investors do not have
to hold a margin account. Also, by comparing to vanilla options, the eﬀects of path
dependence will become clear.
Consider a KO call. The following table summarizes the benchmark parameters
for the contract used in this example. The underlying price is assumed to evolve
consistent with Black-Scholes assumptions, implying that it can be characterized by
the risk-free interest rate (rf ) and the volatility of returns (σ) under the risk-neutral
measure:
Parameter Value
Strike price, K 7750
Barrier, B 8000
Underlying's price, S(0) 8250
Maturity in years, T 0.5
Risk free interest rate, rf 0.05
Volatility of the underlying, σ 0.2
Table 8: Benchmark product characteristics for a KO call. The parameter values
above will be used to illustrate the characteristics of KO warrants.
Figures 1-6 summarize the results. Using the Black-Scholes model, one can ﬁnd a
closed form solution for the price of the KO call, assuming that the residual value in
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case of a knock-out event is the diﬀerence between the barrier and the strike price.23,24
Figures 1-3 show the ∆ (absolute price increase of given product if the price of the
underlying increases by 1 unit) of the KO call, a vanilla call and a futures contract.
The futures contract always has a ∆ = (1 + rf )
T and it is well known that the vanilla
call always has a ∆ < 1. Compared to these, the KO call has a larger ∆, implying
that it is not identical to a futures contract. Observe on Figure 1 that ∆ converges
to 1 for both options as they become heavily in the money. Figure 3 highlights the
eﬀect of volatility on ∆. Contrary to a vanilla call, the KO call has a more stable ∆,
implying that it is more useful for directional bets than a vanilla call.
Figures 4-6 show the Vega (percent change in asset's value if volatility increases
by 1% point) of the three products. Naturally, the futures always has a Vega equal to
zero. Interestingly, the KO call has a negative Vega, implying that the KO call's value
is decreasing in volatility. This is in sharp contrast with the properties of a vanilla call
and highlight the important aﬀect the barrier plays. Higher volatility increases the
probability of a knock-out event resulting in the lowest possible payoﬀ. Observe, that
as volatility increases, the Vega of the KO call will converge to zero as the knock-out
event becomes a certainty (Figure 6).
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Figure 1: This ﬁgure shows the ∆ of a KO call, a vanilla call and a futures contract
as a function of the underlying's price. The ∆ is the absolute change in the price of
the derivative when the underlying's price changes by one unit. Parameters used are
provided in Table 8.
23Rubinstein and Reiner (1991) were the ﬁrst to provide a closed form solution for the value of
barrier options under the Black-Scholes assumptions.
24With this assumption the residual value can me modelled as an American style binary put option,
which has a closed form solution in the Black-Scholes world.
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Figure 2: This ﬁgure shows the ∆ of a KO call, a vanilla call and a futures contract as
a function of the barrier. The ∆ is the absolute change in the price of the derivative
when the underlying's price changes by one unit. Parameters used are provided in
Table 8.
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Figure 3: This ﬁgure shows the ∆ of a KO call, a vanilla call and a futures contract as
a function of the underlying's volatility. The ∆ is the absolute change in the price of
the derivative when the underlying's price changes by one unit. Parameters used are
provided in Table 8.
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Figure 4: This ﬁgure shows the Vega of a KO call, a vanilla call and a futures contract
as a function of the underlying's price. The Vega is the percent change in the price
of the derivative when the underlying's volatility increases by 1% point. Parameters
used are provided in Table 8.
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Figure 5: This ﬁgure shows the Vega of a KO call, a vanilla call and a futures contract
as a function of the barrier. The Vega is the percent change in the price of the derivative
when the underlying's volatility increases by 1% point. Parameters used are provided
in Table 8.
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Figure 6: This ﬁgure shows the Vega of a KO call, a vanilla call and a futures contract
as a function of the underlying's volatility. The Vega is the percent change in the price
of the derivative when the underlying's volatility increases by 1% point. Parameters
used are provided in Table 8.
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